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A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN PRISONERS' RIGHTS:
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
AND REHABILITATION
INTRODUCTION

The evolving attitude of the courts toward judicial interference with the administration of prisons1 has resulted in a
decline of the traditional "hands off doctrine" under which courts
had refused to entertain inmate grievances. 2 As a consequence,
the law of corrections and prisoners' rights has emerged as a
3
prominent part of our jurisprudence.
A major focus of correctional litigation has been the right
to treatment and rehabilitation for prisoners. It is apparent that
this "right" has interested many writers as articles on a prisoner's
right to treatment and rehabilitation constitute the great bulk
of the recent literature of the law of corrections and prisoners'
rights. 4 The literature, however, has been conspicuously devoid 5 of an analysis of a newer, more imaginative "right" which
prisoners may enjoy., This is the right to refuse treatment,
1. See S. KRANTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS, at ch. 14 (1973).

2. The "hands off doctrine" has been supported by claims of (1)
separation of powers, in that prison administration is an executive function; (2) lack of judicial expertise in penology; and (3) fear that judicial intervention will subvert prison discipline. Goldfarb and Singer,
Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 (1970).
For an excellent criticism of the "hands off doctrine" see Note, Beyond
the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 10.41 (1973).

See also PALMER, CON-

3. The law of corrections and prisoners' rights has clearly developed
into a specialized area of law. For collections of cases and materials
see PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: THEORY, LITIGATION, PRACTICE (Hermann & Haft eds. 1973); H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
CONVICTED (1974); S. KRANTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PISONERS' RIGHTS (1973, Supp. 1974); J. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1973); S. RUBIN, LAW OF. CRIMINAL CORRECTION (2d ed. 1973); D. RUDOVSKY, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS:
BASIC ACLU GUIDE To A PRISONER'S RIGHTS (1973).

THE

4. The cases concerning a prisoner's right to treatment and rehabilitation have been collected in the following articles: Plotkin, Enforcing
Prisoners' Rights to Medical Treatment, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 159 (1973);
Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7 (1972); A Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57
GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm.
L. REV. 742 (1969); Comment, A Jam in the Revolving Door: A Prisoner's Right to Rehabilitation,60 GEo. L.J. 225 (1971); Note, A Statutory
Right to Treatment for Prisoners: Society's Right of Self-Defense, 50
NEB. L. REV. 543 (1971). These articles are merely a representative portion of the articles examining a prisoner's right to treatment.
5. An exception is to be found in the area of behavior modification
which has aroused the attention of the public. This facet of correctional
treatment and rehabilitation will be analyzed in a subsequent portion
of this comment.
6. One explanation for the lack of discussion of a prisoner's right
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which would result from judicial acceptance of a prisoner's desire to be "let alone." "Treatment" in the correctional setting
includes the traditional rehabilitative areas-prison labor, educational training, religious training, medical treatment/behavior
modification-to which the prisoner is subjected.
It has been stated that:
Throughout his [the prisoner's] day, if he is in a typical institution, his life is one of sheer monotony, broken only by staccato
orders of discipline or minimal activity. He may be fortunate
enough to work all day on a farm, or undergo vocational training
7
or education, but the chances are slim indeed.
The difficulty with this view is that it is premised upon the idea
that the prisoner desires to engage or will benefit from engaging
in traditional rehabilitation programs. Whether the prisoner will
derive a benefit or not is, perhaps, an improper point of inquiry.
Instead, the focus should be upon the prisoner as the ultimate
consumer of "treatment" and his decision to accept or reject
treatment in the first instance.
It is the purpose of this comment to determine whether a
prisoner's right to refuse treatment exists8 and, if so, to what
extent. The analysis will be based upon an examination of the
applicable case law and constitutional provisions.
THE RIGHT

TO REFUSE "WORK"

Prison labor programs are designed to include prison
employment in the rehabilitation of the inmate. It has been
asserted that:
The aim is to prepare the inmate for a constructive life after
release, and . . . to reduce the alienation of the offender from
society. . . . The tasks are related to the inmate's self-interest.
The rhythm of work and the conditions of employment are as
similar as possible to those in the free world. 10
to refuse treatment is that the concept is at an early stage of its development. See Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis
in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 AtIz. L. Ruv. 39, 41 n.4 (1975).
7. Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to
Rehabilitation, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 365, 372 (1971).
8. One author has commented that if "inmates have the right to refrain from participating in certain religious activities, it would seem they
also have a right to refrain with impunity from participating in other
'beneficial' programs." Singer, The Coming Right to Rehabilitation, in
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOuRC-OOK 195 (Hermann & Haft eds. 1973). To the
contrary, however, Singer's thought is not supported by the case law.
Determining the existence and status of a prisoner's right to refuse treatment is a more difficult task than Singer contemplates.
9. Prison labor programs traditionally have included work in metal
shops, soap factories, woodworking, print shops and farms. These labor
programs have become known as "prison industry."
10. Johnson, Prison Industry, in CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONs 360 (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins eds. 1972).
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Useful, productive labor for all prisoners is, therefore, seen as
a basic element in rehabilitation."
Moreover, prison labor has
been involuntarily imposed upon inmates with overwhelming
approval of the courts 12 based upon the provisions of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." Consequently, prisoners have been unsuccessful in asserting a right
to refuse "work."
Regarding constitutional interpretations of the thirteenth
amendment, the courts have relied heavily upon Draper v.
Rhay' 4 in denying prisoners a right to refuse work. In Draper
a state prisoner claimed that the Superintendent of Washington
State Penitentiary deprived the prisoner of his civil rights by
"forcing petitioner to work, causing slavery and peonage."' 5
The court, in dismissing Draper's claim, held that where a person
is duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for a crime in
accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises.'
The court found that the required work was not
the sort of involuntary servitude which violated thirteenth
11.

S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 326

(2d ed.

1973).

12. Shields v. Hopper, 519 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1975) (regular prison
work detail did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment or deprivation of due process); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963) (no
federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned
after conviction, even though his conviction is being appealed); Cassidy
v. Superintendent, 392 F. Supp. 330 (W.D. Va. 1975) (there is no federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after
conviction, even though that conviction is being appealed); Claybrone
v. Long, 371 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (prisoners are required to
work and if an able prisoner will not work, his freedoms may be further
restrained); Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (state
prisoner does not have a federally protected right not to work while his
conviction is being appealed); Howerton v. Mississippi County, 361 F.
Supp. 356 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (reasonable work requirements may be imposed on one convicted of a crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, without running afoul of the thirteenth or eighth amendments); Laaman v.
Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D.N.H. 1972) (prison inmate may be punished for refusing to work in profit-making prison industry); Sims v.
Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (requirement
that prison inmates, who were lawfully incarcerated, perform services
in clinics operated inside the prison by private drug manufacturers did
not constitute a form of involuntary servitude); Wilson v. Kelley, 294
F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (work and labor by prisoners is not in
itself unconstitutional or unlawful); Wilkinson v. McManus, 299 Minn.
112, 216 N.W.2d 264 (1974) (requiring prisoners to work does not violate
the thirteenth amendment).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1:

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
14. 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963).
15. Id. The question which the prisoner presented to the court was:
"19. Can slavery and/or peonage and/or involuntary servitude be practiced in this Country, in any manner, before there is a final judgment
of conviction for a felonious crime." Id. at 196.
16. Id. at 197.
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amendment rights. 17

With the possible exception

of forced

labor for the purpose of "working off" a fine"8 it is not clear
which types of involuntary prison labor would contravene the
thirteenth amendment.
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by the
eighth amendment to the Constitution' 9 has also proved to be
no obstacle in the path of forced labor in correctional institutions. In Wilson v. Kelley 26 inmates argued that forced participation in "hard labor" work camps constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 2 ' In refusing to accept this argument the court held that "a work camp
per se does not constitute such 'inhuman, barbarious or tortuous
' 22
punishment' as to violate the Eighth Amendment.
Some prisoners have contended that a right to refuse work
exists while their convictions are being appealed. This contention appears to be based on the premise that imprisonment
pursuant to a conviction which is being appealed is less certain
than imprisonment pursuant to an unchallenged conviction.
Prisoners have urged that forced labor under these circumstances
deprives them of the time necessary to prepare an appeal and
access to legal materials, books and counsel. 23 This claim has
been to no avail. Without exception, every court considering this
issue has held that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right
not to work while imprisoned after conviction, even though that
24
conviction is being appealed.
17. Id. The Draper court cited with approval Butler v. Perry, 240
U.S. 328, 332 (1916):
[The thirteenth amendment] was adopted with reference to conditions existing since the foundation of our Government, and the term
involuntary servitude was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation
would tend to produce like undesirable results.
18. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). In Tate, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an indigent defendant who was
sent to a municipal prison farm to "work off" his accumulated fines for
traffic offenses. The Supreme Court did not reverse based upon the thirteenth amendment but upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court did not entertain a thirteenth amendment
argument, thus, it is impossible to determine if the defendant's conviction
could have been reversed on thirteenth amendment grounds.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
20. 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
21. The inmates also argued that hard labor constituted involuntary
servitude under the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 1012.
22. Id.
23. Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
24. See Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Cassidy v. Superintendent, 392 F. Supp. 330 (W.D. Va. 1975); Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp.
1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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The classification of prisoners as felons or misdemeanants
and the right to refuse work have presented a problem easily
resolved by one court. In Howerton v. Mississippi County25 inmates convicted of misdemeanors alleged that the working of
misdemeanants without compensation on public projects was contrary to constitutional principles. It was claimed that a person
convicted of a misdemeanor could not be compelled to work, but
must be given a choice, or else incarceration in a county penal
farm would contravene the constitutional proscriptions of involuntary servitude and cruel and unusual punishment. The
court was not persuaded by this argument and held that reasonable work requirements may be imposed on one convicted of a
crime whether misdemeanor or felony, without running afoul
2of the thirteenth or eighth amendments.
Since a prisoner cannot justify his refusal to work, if
physically able, failure to comply with work orders may lead to
undesirable results. In Laaman v. Hancock2 7 a prisoner claimed
that he could not, in good faith, work in a profit-making prison
industry as this would be in direct violation of his deeply-held
principles and conscience. He had expressed his willingness to
work in any other job capacity so long as the work did not
involve a profit-making shop. In spite of this desire, the prisoner
was assigned to work in a profit-making print shop. Upon
refusal to work, disciplinary action was taken and the prisoner
was confined to his cell for twenty-three and one-half hours per
day. The court, in approving the disciplinary action, adopted the
"hands off doctrine," holding that:
Since petitioner has not shown any deprivation of his constitutional rights28 and since petitioner can voluntarily end his
confinement by returning to work at the job to which he was
peculiarly
assigned, we will not intervene in disciplinary matters
29
within the discretion of state prison authorities.
The law of corrections and prisoners' rights clearly does not
include a right to refuse work. Prisoners not only can be constitutionally forced to work but can also be disciplined for failure
to do so. Although forced and unrewarded labor in prison provides little incentive for diligence and development of skill,11 the
prisoner cannot complain with impunity. He must work.
25.
26.
27.
28.
failed.

361 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
Id. at 364.
351 F. Supp. 1265 (D.N.H. 1972).
The prisoner's eighth and fourteenth amendment

arguments

29. Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D.N.H. 1972).
30. Johnson, Prison Industry, in CORRECTIONAL INsTITUTIONs
(Carter, Glaser & Wilkins eds. 1972).

363
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REFUSING EDUCATION AS TREATMENT:
A PRISONER'S RIGHT To BE IGNORANT

Educational programs in correctional institutions have had
limited effect because of: (1) a failure to interest the inmate
and (2) a failure to allow the inmate to believe that he is
regarded within the program as personally important. 31 Nevertheless, participation in correctional education may be involuntary. These incompatible factors perhaps have combined as the
basis, in two recent cases,3 2 for the claim that a prisoner has
a right to refuse to be educated.
In Rutherford v. Hutto,3 an illiterate prisoner claimed that
his forced attendance at elementary school classes in an Arkansas prison violated his. first, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. Participation in the school program was voluntary
for inmates who had attained a fourth grade educational level,
but was required for those not possessed of a fourth grade education. The classes were ungraded and the prisoners were not
under pressure to progress at any specific pace. In fact, Rutherford had increased his reading skills and mathematical ability
despite his involuntary participation.
Rutherford, with no interest in participating, complained
that forced education caused him nervousness and asserted that
he had a constitutional right to remain ignorant and illiterate.
The court, without entertaining the prisoner's specific constitutional arguments, rejected the assertion, holding that the constitutional right to be ignorant or uneducated does not exist. The
court found that the state had a sufficient interest in eliminating
illiteracy among its convicts to justify it in requiring illiterate
convicts, including adults, to attend classes designed to bring
them up to at least the fourth grade level.3 4 This involuntary

participation presumably would be constitutional so long as the
educational instruction had no adverse affect and prisoners were
not punished for failure to learn.3 5 The court did not make a
31. See Glaser, The Effectiveness of CorrectionalEducation, in CoR-

R}ECTTONAL INSTITUTIONs 328 (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins eds. 1972).

32. Jackson v. McLemore, 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975); Rutherford
v. Hutto, 377 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
33. 377 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
34. Id. at 272.
35. Id. There was also very strong dicta urging that a prisoner has

no right to refuse any rehabilitation or treatment offered in a correctional
institution.
[The] Court does not think that it should necessarily be left up to

an individual convict to determine whether or not he is to participate
in a rehabilitative program such as the one involved here. To put
it another way, if a State can compel a convict to perform uncom-

pensated labor for the benefit of the State, as can constitutionally
be done, . . . a fortiori a State has the constitutional power to require
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determination as to involuntary vocational education or elementary education beyond the fourth grade. However, from the
rationale employed, the court would seemingly favor required
education if faced with either of these situations. 6
In Jackson v. McLemore 37 the Arkansas Department of
Corrections was again involved in litigation regarding the right
to refuse educational "treatment." In fact, at issue was the same
compulsory educational program which was considered in
Rutherford. In Jackson, the prisoner refused to spell certain
words in class and as a consequence was placed in segregated
confinement pending disciplinary action. Citing Rutherford with
approval, the court upheld the compulsory education program
up to the fourth grade level and the disciplinary action.
While a prisoner may not be punished simply because he failed
to learn, either through inability or lack of motivation, he may
be required to participate in the program. . . . Refusal to participate is clearly distinguishable from a stated inability to perform, and such refusal in a penal institution may properly result
in disciplinary action.38
It is important to note that neither Rutherford nor Jackson
concerned vocational education. An argument can be made that
vocational education, unlike elementary education, is more than
basic and hence unnecessary for the inmate to make a successful return to society and therefore should not be compulsory.
On the other hand vocational training may be a major factor
in the prisoner's favor when the prisoner is released and searches
for employment. It has been urged that, in the ideal situation,
prison vocational education would wed job requirements with
inmate self interest.3 9 This "ideal situation," however, assumes
compulsory vocational training and suggests "right" to refuse
treatment arguments not yet entertained by the courts. A
counter argument focuses upon the inmate as the beneficiary of
a vocational education program and allows the inmate to make
the decision whether or not to participate in the first instance.
Neither the Rutherford nor Jackson court considered the
effect of "inmate ignorance" on the correctional institution and
society. The purpose of compulsory education for prisoners,
a convict to participate in a rehabilitative program designed to benefit the convict.
[The] Court does not consider that a convict has any more right to
refuse to be given a chance to benefit from a rehabilitative program
than he has to refuse work or to obey other lawful orders that may
be given him by prison personnel.

Id.

36. See note 35 supra.

37. 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975).

38. Id. at 839.

39. Johnson, Prison Industry, in
(Carter, Glaser &Wilkins eds. 1972).

CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTIONs

361
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other than to limit idleness, was never clarified by either court.
Consequently it is not clear why the state was held to have an
interest to justify the compulsory education of illiterate prisoners. In fact, in Rutherford the court found that without compulsory education the prisoner could make a living as a machine
40
operator-the occupation specifically desired by the inmate.
Neither court expressed the belief that the correctional institution or society would be endangered if educational treatment
was not required. As a consequence, there is an absence of
logical support for the decisions in Rutherford and Jackson. Unless it is clear that prisoners choosing to avoid educational
programs represent more serious threats to the correctional institutions and society than if they were educated, it is indefensible
to require participation in educational programs on an involuntary basis.4 ' Because of the weaknesses of present programs and
their questionable value to the inmate, there may be a point at
which a prisoner has a right to refuse participation.
REFUSING RELIGION AS "TREATMENT"

Opposition to compulsory religious activity was recently the
basis of a claim in at least one correctional institution.42 Although attendance at religious services or conferences with
clergy may have some rehabilitative value, involuntary religious
participation cannot be justified under the establishment and
free exercise clause of the first amendment. 43 Therefore, to
deny atheists or agnostics in prison the freedom of movement,
assembly, and visits from nonreligious purposes equal to those
granted to other inmates who profess a religion violates the pro44
tections of the first amendment.
That nonparticipation in religious activity within a correctional institution cannot be considered in an inmate's
parole evaluation is exemplified by Theriault v. Carlson.4 5 In
Theriault, prison chaplains had submitted reports to caseworkers
at the Atlanta federal penitentiary in which they commented on
the inmates' participation or lack of participation in religious
40. Rutherford v. Hutto, 377 F. Supp. 268, 270 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
41. Geis, Ethical and Legal Issues in Experimentation with Offender
Populations, in CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 497 (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins eds. 1972).

42. Cassidy v. Superintendent, 392 F. Supp. 330, 334 (W.D. Va. 1975).
The court found no truth to the allegation and held that this portion

of Cassidy's pleadings was without merit.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
44. H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 391

(1974).

45. 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

Right to Refuse Treatment and Rehabilitation
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activities. These reports constituted part of the inmates' profiles
which had been presented to the Board of Parole. The religious
reports submitted by the chaplains were potentially an important
consideration in the granting or denial of parole.
In holding the evaluation procedure unconstitutional, the
court noted that the correctional institution had violated the
neutrality which must be maintained with respect to religion.
The court found that in allowing the submission of the religious
reports, religion was being promoted and atheistic or agnostic
prisoners, who had declined to participate, were being indirectly
punished. 4 6 The Theriault court cited the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas,47 quoting the
following language:
Government in our democracy ....
must be neutral in matters
of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile
to any religion or to the advocacy of non-religion; and it may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and
48
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.
As a consequence the submission of religious reports was
enjoined.
Voluntary participation by prisoners in religious activities
has been recently established by a correctional institution4 9 and
urged by model rules and regulations for prisoners' rights and
responsibilities.5" These recommendations in conjunction with
the religious protection of the first amendment suggest by
analogy that the right to refuse religious activity as "treatment"
is an integral part of the law of corrections and prisoners' rights.
46. Id. at 382.

47. 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).

48. Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375, 382 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
49. Howerton v. Mississippi County, 361 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Ark.

1973). The court stated:

Religious services are and will be held each week at the penal farm.
Attendance will be voluntary. Religious freedom is and will be en-

couraged at the institution and no inmate's freedom to worship in
the religion of his choice wil be hampered or interfered with by
the institution.

Id. at 362.
50.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE-PART III

MENT AND CORRECTION

ON TREAT-

(1962):

Section 303.5, 304.6 Program of Rehabilitation
No prisoner shall be ordered or compelled, however to participate
in religious activities.

FOURTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREAT-

MENT OF OFFENDERS, STANDARD

MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF

PRISONES (1955):

Religion 41. (3) Access to a qualified representative of any religion
shall not be refused to any prisoner. On the other hand, if any prisoner should object to a visit of any religious representative, his atti-

tude should be fully respected.

S. KANTz, R.

BELL,

J.

BRANDT, M. MAGRUDER, MODEL RULES AND REGu-
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REFUSING MEDICAL CARE AND BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

Medical treatment in correctional institutions is of two types.
Medical aid may be offered to cure a physical disability or it
may be for behavior modification/rehabilitation purposes. While
the former is designed to restore the prisoner's health, the latter
type of medical treatment is a "mind shaping" device and has
received great attention from the legal community.,'
Under
either form of medical treatment, questions of a prisoner's right
to refuse such treatment arises.

Medical Treatment for Physical Disability
Courts have been reluctant to involve themselves in claims
32-33 (1973):
Rule 1B-1 Religious Coercion
a. There will be no discrimination against an inmate because
of his religious belief or practice. No inmate shall be compelled to
attend religious services, nor be dissuaded from participating in any
religious program or attending any service unless otherwise pro-

LATIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

scribed in these rules. An inmate shall be permitted to change his
religious affiliation at any time without interference. Participation
or non-participation in religious activity shall not be used as a criteria in determining eligibility or recommendation for any specific
program within the institution.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL STANDARDS AND GOALS (1973):
Standard.2.16 Exercise of Religious Beliefs and Practices
In making judgments regarding the adjustment or rehabilitation
of an offender, the correctional agency may consider the attitudes
and perceptions of the offender but should not:
2. Impose, as a condition of confinement, parole, probation, or
release, adherence to the active practice of any religion or religious
belief.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1972):
§ 2 Inhumane Treatment Prohibited
Inhumane treatment includes but is not limited to the following
acts or activities and is hereby prohibited:
(f) Any discriminatory treatment based upon the prisoner's
race, religion, nationality, or political beliefs.
NATIONAL SHERIFFS' Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR INMATES' LEGAL RIGHTS (1974):

18. Religious Freedom
Prisoners have the right to freedom of religious affiliation and voluntary religious worship....
51. See Moya & Achtenberg, Behavior Modification: Legal Limitations on Methods and Goals, 50 N.D. LAW. 230 (1974); Opton, Psychiatric
Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J.
605 (1974); Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Orqanic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237
(1974); Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1972); Wexler, Of Rights and Reinforcers, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (1974); Comment, Aversion Therapy: Its Limited Potential for Use in the Correctional Setting, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1327 (1974); Note, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Free from Experimental
Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301 (1974); Note, Conditioning and Other
Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners
and Mental Patients,45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972); Note, Behavior Modification in Prison and the Eighth Amendment, 6 TOLEDO L. REV. 252
(1974).
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of medical mistreatment in prisons, 52 because judges tend to
assume that a physician aims to help his patients. 53 Nevertheless, the advice and treatment recommended by a physician to
a non-prisoner need not be accepted by the patient. Consequently, the issue arises as to whether a prisoner, by reason of
his inmate status, loses the right to reject medical treatment
which is enjoyed by non-prisoners.
Sawyer v. Sigler 54 illustrates the judicial approach to the
claim of a right to refuse medical treatment by a prisoner based
upon the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment. 55 In Sawyer, the prisoner had been treated for
emphysema with medicine in pill or capsule form. In an effort
to curtail pill and capsule hoarding by prisoners, the prison
changed its policy and required prisoners to take medication in
crushed or liquid form. Sawyer refused to take the medicine
in altered form and wrapped the crushed medication in paper
before swallowing it so as to avoid the nausea which he experienced from the changed medication.
The prison administration refused to allow Sawyer to continue his "personalized" approach to his medical treatment.
Sawyer then brought a civil rights action 6 urging that the
forced medical treatment constituted cruel and inhuman punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment.
In evaluating medical treatment, such as that rendered in
Sawyer, for violations of the eighth amendment a major conceptual problem arises. The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, not treatment. Perhaps, therefore, treatment must initially be determined to be punishment prior to
its being held cruel and unusual. This two step analysis is
supported by analogy with the traditional tests for the determination of cruel and unusual punishment.
52. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations of Prisoners' Right to
Medical Treatment, 44 Miss. L.J. 525-28 (1973). See also Patmore v.
Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975) regarding the "hands off doc-

trine" of judicial intervention and a prisoner's claim of medical mistreatment.
53. Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is
Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605, 620 (1974).
54. 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970).

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulations,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
55.

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
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The first traditional test is whether under all the circumstances the punishment in question is of such character as to
shock the general conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness. 7 According to a second test, punishment may be cruel
and unusual if greatly disproportionate to the offense for which
it is imposed.5 8 Finally, a punishment may be cruel and unusual when, although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim,
it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim; that is,
when a punishment is unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose
for which it is used. 59
The Sawyer court, in finding that the change in Sawyer's
medicine to a crushed or liquid form constituted "cruel and
inhuman" punishment did not rely on any of the traditional
tests. Instead the court looked to the results of the medical
treatment-Sawyer's nausea-to find an eighth amendment violation. The court stated:
[N]o effort has been made in this case to show that Sawyer
has or ever has had any tendency to hoard narcotics or that a
policy against hoarding cannot reasonably be carried out on a
selective basis. In the absence of that kind of showing, [we]
conclude that requiring Sawyer to take his medication in a form
which results in nausea is sufficiently unusual, exceptional and
arbitrary to constitute ... cruel and inhuman punishment ....60

In fact, the court cited with approval, Cates v. Ciccone,61 noting
that "the prisoner cannot be the ultimate judge of what medical
treatment is necessary or proper for his care. '6 2 This language
seems to reject the "type of treatment as punishment" approach
which is illustrated by the three traditional tests.
Consequently, Sawyer provides a fourth test which does not
require a finding that the type of medical treatment administered
constitutes punishment for that treatment to contravene the provisions of the eighth amendment. Focusing on the result of
medical treatment rather than its form clearly provides a
prisoner with a better opportunity to assert a right to refuse
medical treatment.
When medical treatment for the purpose of curing physical
disability is in the form of surgery, the recent case of Runnels
v. Rosendale 3 provides an imaginative approach to the prisoner's
right to refuse treatment. Runnels, an inmate at the Folsom
State Prison in California, was subjected to a hemorrhoidectomy
57. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
58. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

59. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).

60.
61.
62.
63.

Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Neb. 1970).
422 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970).
320 F. Supp. 690, 693 (D.Neb. 1970).
499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974),
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though he had "vigorously and repeatedly refused to give his
consent to such an operation." 64 Consequently, Runnels filed
a civil rights6 5 action against the two prison physicians who
had allegedly conducted the surgery. Summary judgment was
granted in favor of the physicians.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding interesting constitutional bases for the prisoner's claim. The court first
found that the prisoner's constitutionally protected right to be
secure in the privacy of his own body was violated in the course
of his treatment by prison medical personnel. Secondly, the
court found that there had been a violation of the prisoner's constitutional right to be free from unprovoked physical assault by
agents of the state while in state custody.66 The court, however,
limited the application of these constitutional rights to cases of
"major surgery, when such surgery is neither consented to nor
'
required for purposes of imprisonment or security. "67
If the inmate has the right to refuse major surgical medical
treatment, as the Runnels court suggests, it is not clear how this
right is qualified or limited if surgery is "required for purposes
of imprisonment or security." It is not clear to whose "security"
the court refers. If the court refers to the physical security of
the inmate, an inconsistency in the court's reasoning appears,
because the court found the unwanted surgery analogous to an
assault though the surgery was performed to improve the
inmate's physical security. If, on the other hand, the court refers
to the security of the correctional institution, how will the institution become endangered if the surgery is not performed? This
was not explained.
The surgery in Runnels does not appear to have been
administered under emergency circumstances. If emergency circumstances did exist would the interest of the correctional
institution in curing inmates of physical disabilities outweigh the
inmate's interest in refusing the medical aid? The Runnels court
did not speak to this issue and, presently, the issue seems unresolved.
Apart from any constitutionally based argument, a prisoner
would seem to have a right to refuse medical treatment based
upon the law of torts. Medical treatment consists of contact with
64. Id. at 734.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974). See note 56 supra.
66. This second constitutional right was derived from a series of ninth

circuit cases:

Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822 (9th

Cir. 1969); Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir. 1968); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1966). None of these
cases, however, were concerned with unwanted medical treatment, but
rather dealt with prisoner beatings.
67. 499 F.2d at 735.
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the patient's body, and any intentional and unpermitted contact
with a person is battery. 6 The problem with this approach is
that upon imprisonment, the prisoner may suffer "civil death,"
resulting in the loss of many civil rights including the right to
bring a civil suit.69 Nevertheless, even if a prisoner is precluded
from bringing a civil suit for battery based upon unwanted medical treatment, a right to refuse medical treatment founded upon
tort principles would not seem implausible.
It has been proposed that medical treatment imposed to cure
a prisoner's physical disability does not fit well within the traditional approaches to determine the existence of cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment. Unwanted medical
treatment in the form of surgery, resulting in a violation of the
constitutional "right" to be free from unprovoked assaults,
accounts for an analysis frought with inconsistency. A tort basis
for refusal of treatment is equally strained due to the notion
of "civil death." Pragmatically, whether a prisoner can refuse
medical treatment may depend upon the policy of the correctional administrator and his sensitivities to the dilemma of
whether to impose unwanted medical treatment or to stand
aside. 70 To be sure, this is not a sound manner of discovering
a "right"-cautious reliance should be placed upon it. Consequently, until definitive cases are forthcoming, the right to refuse
medical treatment, imposed to cure a physical disability, remains
an uncertain segment of the law of corrections and prisoners'
rights.
Behavior Modification
It is clear that some courts have recognized a prisoner's right
to refuse medical treatment when that treatment was for purposes of behavior modification. 71 Medical treatment of such
"mind shaping" dimensions may be psychiatric, surgical or drug
related in nature. Each of these medical treatments seeks to
introduce into the prisoner a stimulus by which the prisoner's
behavior will be altered. The difficulty with this type of treatment is that it severs from the prisoner certain behavior in a

68. See

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (1971).
69. Civil death, which deprives the criminal of all or almost all of
his civil rights while he is serving a prison sentence, is not existent in
all states. Some civil death statutes specifically grant the right to sue.
See H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED, ch. 2 at 55
& n.59 (1974).
70. See SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECrONS, THE EMERGING
RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 153-54 (1972).
71. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental

Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (6.ir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich., July 10,
1973).
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particularly intrusive way. As a consequence, novel constitutional protections have been developed and traditional protections relied upon to safeguard the prisoner from unwanted
behavior modification. Not every court recognizing a prisoner's
right to refuse behavior modification has invoked all of the available constitutional protections. Theoretically, however, each
protection could have been applied in each case. Therefore, the
entire constitutional foundation of a prisoner's right to refuse
behavior modification will be set forth prior to a discussion of
the cases.
A novel, but quite persuasive first amendment 2 basis for
a prisoner's right to refuse behavior modification has been
developed. This approach requires a belief that the first amendment protects not only the freedom of expression but also the
"power to generate thought, ideas and mental activity, '7 3 referred to as the "freedom of mentation. 7 4 From this, the following argument has been made:
(1) The first amendment protects communication of virtually
all kinds, whether in written, verbal, pictorial or any symbolic
form, and whether cognitive or emotive in nature.
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of
whatever is communicated.
(3) Transmission and reception necessarily involve mentation
on the part of both the person transmitting and the person
receiving.
(4) It is in fact impossible to distinguish in advance mentation
which will be involved in or necessary to transmission and
reception from mentation which will not.
(5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation (regardless of its potential involvement in transmission or reception)
must therefore be protected.
(6) [Behavior modification] intrusively alters or interferes with
mentation.

(7) The first amendment therefore protects persons against
enforced alteration or interference with their mentation by [behavior modification] .5
If this argument is accepted, unwanted but enforced behavior modification would infringe upon the protections of the first
amendment.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-

ances.
73. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237,
255-56 (1974).
74. Id. at 255-56.
75. This illustration of the first amendment argument has been
adopted from Shapiro. Id. at 256-57.
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The fourth amendment 76 provides another imaginative basis
for a prisoner's right to refuse behavior modification. If the constitutional right of privacy is embodied in the fourth amendment,
it arguably protects the sanctity of the body, including the mind.
Unwanted behavior modification, as a mind altering process
would violate the right of privacy. Furthermore, behavior modification by psychosurgery removes a portion of the brain and
the thought incident to it. Consequently, an "unreasonable
seizure," prohibited by the fourth amendment, may occur.
The more traditional constitutional approach to behavior
modification concerns the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment. 77 With respect to behavior modification constituting an extreme method of treatment, there may not
be the initial problem of finding the behavior modification to
be punishment and subsequently determining it to be cruel and
unusual. One court has noted:
Since-the argument runs-by definition .. .treatment is not
"punishment," it obviously cannot be "cruel and unusual punishment." But neither the label which a State places on its own
conduct, nor even the legitimacy of its motivation can avoid the
applicability of the Federal Constitution. We have no doubt that
well intentioned attempts to rehabilitate a [prisoner] could, in
extreme circumstances, constitute cruel
and unusual punishment
78
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.
The essence of these constitutional foundations of a prisoner's right to refuse behavior modification is that the constitution
prohibits the "impermissible tinkering with [a prisoner's] mental
processes." 79 Keeping these foundations in mind, the behavior
modification cases can be analyzed with a view to a court's use
of these foundations, or lack thereof where the foundations may
have been applicable.
The United States Supreme Court, in McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution0 declined the opportunity to determine
whether an inmate had a right to refuse psychiatric treatment.
McNeil had been convicted of assault and sentenced to five years
imprisonment. Instead of committing him to prison, the sentencing court referred him to the Patuxent Institution for examina-

76. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 1:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
78. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973).
79. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973).
80. 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
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tion, to determine whether he should be committed to that
institution for an indeterminate term under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law. 81
McNeil refused to cooperate with the examining psychiatrists
and was confined for six years without a complete adversary
hearing on his status as a defective delinquent. After the fifth
year McNeil sought post-conviction relief alleging that his confinement violated due process of law. The trial court denied
relief and the court of appeals denied leave to appeal. The
Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with McNeil's contention that
his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law had been
violated. His sentence having expired, McNeil was ordered to
be released.8 2 The Supreme Court did not entertain the fact
that McNeil had refused psychiatric treatment and, as a consequence, added no support to the concept of a prisoner's right
to refuse behavior modification.
In 1973, through two significant cases, 3 the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals struck major blows for a prisoner's right to refuse behavior modification by means of aversive
drug therapy. Aversion therapy consists of:
[A]ttempts to train the [prisoner] to be disgusted by or at least
ambivalent toward the deviant objects and experiences that he
formerly valued highly. To accomplish this result, the behavior
therapist presents the deviant object to the [prisoner] or induces
the [prisoner] to engage or imagine engaging in the deviant
behavior. Immediately thereafter, the therapist induces an aver[prisoner] by a nausea-creating . . . or
sive reaction in 8the
4
a paralyzing drug.
In Mackey v. Procunier5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a state prisoner's complaint of receiving unwanted "fright drug" treatment sufficiently alleged a violation of
the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner had consented to be sent to the California
Medical Facility for the purpose of undergoing shock treatment.
However, without consent, and not as part of the shock treat81. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B (1971). Section 5 of the statute defines
defective delinquent as:
[A]n individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated
antisocial or criminal behavior evidences a propensity toward criminal activity and who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate
an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement and
treatment, .
It appears as if McNeil, if found to be a defective delinquent, would have
been subjected to some psychiatric behavior modification.
82. 407 U.S. 245 252 (1972).
83. Knecht v. dillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. Comment, Aversion Therapy: Its Limited Potential for Use in

the CorrectionalSetting, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1327, 1328-29 (1974).
85. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
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ment, the prisoner was administered the drug succinylcholine,
which the prisoner characterized as a "breath-stopping and paralyzing fright drug." 6 There was no error in the prisoner's char87
acterization of the drug.
The court found that the prisoner stated a claim for violation
of his civil rights:
Proof of such matters could, in our judgment, raise serious
constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual 88punishment
or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes.
In Knecht v. Gillman"' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found forced aversion drug therapy at the Iowa Security
Medical Facility to be cruel and unusual punishment in much
the same manner as the Mackey court. The Iowa Security Medical Facility is an institution for persons displaying evidence of
mental illness or psychological disorders and requiring diagnostic
services and treatment in a security setting. Mentally ill persons
constitute a portion of the Facility's population.
In Knecht, the drug apomorphine was administered to
prisoners without their consent for minor violations of Facility
rules.90 The drug induced vomiting and a temporary adverse
The testimony relating to the success
cardiovascular effect.'
of behavior modification through the use of apomorphine as an
aversive stimulus was inconclusive92 and this uncertainty afforded the court the opportunity to find the administration of
the drug without consent to be cruel and unusual punishment.
The court stated:
86. Id.

87. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 645 (28th ed. 1974).
choline causes skeletal muscle paralysis.
88. 477 F.2d at 878.

Succinyl-

89. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
90. These violations included "not getting up, for giving cigarettes
against orders, for talking, for swearing, or for lying."
Id. at 1137.
91. The chemistry and effect of apomorphine is well documented in
L.

GOODMAN

& A.

GILLMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS

252 (4th ed. 1970).
92. The court acknowledged the questionable value of the administration of apomorphine:
The testimony relating to the medical acceptability of this treatment is not conclusive. Dr. Steven Fox of the University of Iowa
testified that behavior modification by aversive stimuli is "highly
questionable technique" and that only a 20% to 50% success is
claimed. He stated that it is not being used elsewhere to his knowledge and that its use is really punishment worse than a controlled
beating since the one administering the drug can't control it after
it is administered.

On the other hand, Dr. Loeffelholz of the ISMF staff testified
that there had been a 50% to 60% effect in modifying behavior by
the use of apomorphine at ISMF. There is no evidence that the drug
is used at any other inmate medical facility in any other state.

488 F.2d at 1138.
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The use of apomorphine, then, can be justified, only if it
can be said to be treatment. Based upon the testimony adduced
at the hearing and the finding made by the magistrate and
adopted by the trial court, it is not possible to say that the use
of apomorphine is a recognized and acceptable medical practice
in institutions such as ISMF. ... .93
Based on the unproven character of the drug and its administration without the consent of the prisoners, the court found a
violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. The court enjoined the use of apomorphine
at the Facility except when there was compliance with the
following conditions:
1. A written consent must be obtained from the inmate specifying the nature of the treatment, a written description of the
purpose, risks and effects of treatment, and advising the
inmate of his right to terminate the consent at any time.
This consent must include a certification by a physician that
the patient has read and understands all of the terms of the
consent and that the inmate is mentally competent to understand fully all of the provisions thereof and give his consent
thereto.
2. The consent may be revoked at any time after it is given
and if an inmate orally expresses an intention to revoke it
to any member of the staff, a revocation form shall be pro-

vided for his signature at once.

....

94

These conditions, limiting the use of apomorphine as an
aversive stimulus, clearly define a prisoner's right to refuse this
type of behavior modification. Mackey and Knecht constitute a
strong constitutional foundation for this "right" and should be
highly persuasive in other jurisdictions.
The most intrusive type of behavior modification, violating
two constitutional protections, has been the psychosurgery considered in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health.95 In
Kaimowitz, John Doe9" had been committed to a state hospital
as a criminal sexual psychopath without a trial of criminal
charges. Doe had been charged with the rape and murder of
a student nurse at another hospital where he had been a mental
patient. Since these are criminal charges for which Doe presumably could have been convicted, it is reasonable to include Doe's
proposed behavior modification in a discussion of prisoners'
rights.
Under a study funded by the Michigan legislature, Doe was
found to be a suitable research subject for the study of uncon93. Id. at 1138.
94. Id. at 1140.
95. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne Co Mich., July 10, 1973).
96. The name John Doe was used throughout the proceedings to protect the identity of the subject. Subsequently his true identity, Louis
Smith, was revealed. He will be referred to as Doe.
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trollable aggression by experimental psychosurgery.9 7 Kaimowitz, on behalf of Doe, brought a habeas corpus action, alleging
that Doe was being illegally detained for the purpose of experimental psychosurgery. Doe was subsequently released and the
funds for the study withdrawn. Nevertheless, the court refused
to find Doe's allegations moot as the study could be instituted
at a later date.
According to the court, the proposed psychosurgery would
have violated Doe's first and fourth amendment rights. The violations were derived from the initial finding that Doe could not
have given an informed consent 8 to the psychosurgery. 9
The
97. Psychosurgery was defined in Kaimowitz by Dr. Bertram S.
Brown, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health.
[A] surgical removal or destruction of brain tissue or the cutting
of brain tissue to disconnect one part of the brain from another, with
the intent of altering the behavior even though there may be no direct evidence of structural disease or damage to the brain.
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir.
Ct., Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
98. Doe did sign a consent to the psychosurgery which was held invalid by the court upon finding that as an involuntarily confined mental
patient, Doe could not give informed consent. Doe signed the following
"consent":
Since conventional treatment efforts over a period of several
years have not enabled me to control my outbursts of rage and antisocial behavior, I submit an application to be a subject in a research
project which may offer me a form of effective therapy. This therapy is based upon the idea that episodes of anti-social rage and sexuality might be triggered by a disturbance in certain portions of my
brain. I understand that in order to be certain that a significant
brain disturbance exists, which might relate to my anti-social behavior, an initial operation will have to be performed. This procedure consists of placing fine wires into my brain, which will record
the electrical activity from those structures which play a part in
anger and sexuality. These electrical waves can then be studied to
determine the presence of an abnormality.
In addition electrical stimulation with weak currents passed
through these wires will be done in order to find out if one or several points in the brain can trigger my episodes of violence or unlawful sexuality. In other words this stimulation may cause me to want
to commit an aggressive or sexual act, but every effort will be made
to have a sufficient number of people present to control me. If the
brain disturbance is limited to a small area, I understand that the
investigators will destroy this part of my brain with an electrical
current. If the abnormality comes from a larger part of my brain,
I agree that it should be surgically removed, if the doctors determine
that it can be done so, without risk of side effects. Should the electrical activity from the parts of my brain into which the wires have
been placed reveal that there is no significant abnormality, the wires
will simply be withdrawn.
I realize that any operation on the brain carries a number of
risks which may be slight, but could be potentially serious. These
risks include infection, bleeding, temporary or permanent weakness
or paralysis of one or more of my legs or arms, difficulties with
speech and thinking, as well as the ability to feel, touch, pain and
temperature. Under extraordinary circumstances, it is also possible
that I might not survive the operation.
Fully aware of the risks detailed in the paragraphs above, I authorize the physicians of Lafayette Clinic and Providence Hospital
to perform the procedures as outlined above.
See id.at 4.
99. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 19434-AW,
18-31 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co. Mich., July 10, 1973).
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court found a first amendment guarantee of the freedom to
generate new ideas in addition to guaranteeing the expression
of ideas already formulated. The history of psychosurgery had
illustrated the irreversability of destruction or diminution of the
subject's ability to engage in these first amendment freedoms.
Consequently, the court held that this dulling effect upon a subject's mental processes due to psychosurgery would be a violation
of his first amendment rights. 10 0
The Kaimowitz court also stated that the proposed psychosurgery would constitute a violation of Doe's fourth amendment
protections. Psychosurgery performed upon a subject incapable
of consenting would not only violate his general right of privacy
but arguably would constitute an illegal seizure as well, due to
the removal of a portion of the subject's brain. 1 1
Kaimowitz represents another major stepping stone, along
with Mackey and Knecht, to the formulation of a prisoner's right
to refuse a specific type of behavior modification. A remaining
issue, however, is whether a court, upon finding unwanted behavior modification, should enjoin its use summarily. The argument
against this approach is that:
[I]f society is to balance the objectives of preserving human
autonomy and achieving conforming behavior, it must not speak
of general rights against treatment and rehabilitation. Rather,
it must ask which specific therapies an inmate should have a
right against. Factors that would be relevant in such an analysis
include: (1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior
patterns and mental activity effected by the therapy-the degree
of change in personality; (2) the side effects associated with the
therapy; (3) the extent to which the therapy requires physical
intrusion into the inmate's body; (4) the degree of pain, if any,
associated with the therapy; and (5) the extent to which an
uncooperative inmate can avoid the effects of the therapy. 10 2
Summary treatment of behavior modification is less likely
to occur since courts generally decide issues involved in any case
in a narrow fashion. However, in Clonce v. Richardson0 3 the
opportunity for a sweeping decision on involuntary behavior
modification did exist. In Clonce, the Special Treatment and
Rehabilitative Training Program' 04 for federal prisoners was
scrutinized by the United States District Court. Project START
100. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra. Id. at 36-39.
102. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat"?
"Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL.
L.REv. 616, 658 (1972).
103. 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
104. Hereinafter referred to as START.
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was developed for prisoners who had failed to adjust to their
respective prison environments. START was a positive reinforcement behavior modification device wherein participating
inmates were stripped of many rights and privileges which could
be regained only through appropriate behavior. The right to
religious freedom, access to reading materials, freedom of speech
and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures were severely restricted under the START project. In Clonce, the inmate
petitioners urged that these restrictions and the involuntary behavior modification program violated their first, fourth and
eighth amendment protections. 10 5
During the course of the litigation, START was terminated
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons due to the insufficient number
of inmates selected for the program. The court noted comments
by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Norman A. Carlson,
regarding behavior modification, that:
We recognize that 'behavior modification' does not represent
a panacea or cure all for the deficiencies in correctional programming. It is, however, a valuable treatment technique which
can be effectively used to motivate some groups of offenders.
For this reason, 'behavior modification' using positive rewards
is an integral part of many of our correctional programs and
the Bureau of Prisons will continue to use this technique when0 6
ever appropriate.'
Thus, it was found that some of the issues raised by the prisoners
remained justiciable, and others were rendered moot due to the
termination of the START project.
The court found that the issue of whether a prisoner has
the right to refuse behavior modification was rendered moot by
the voluntary termination of START. Consequently, the court
failed to resolve the issue and stated:
[T]he resolution of that question in regard to some new program
will involve a very precise examination of the specific factual
circumstances involved in the new program, when and if
challenged.
A program patterned on the experience of S.T.A.R.T. may
be instituted by the Bureau of Prisons at some future time but
that a program exactly like S.T.A.R.T. will be instituted is highly
unlikely. An examination of a possible program to determine
it susceptibility to an Eighth Amendment challenge is impossible.
107

Consequently, examination of specific types of behavior
modification has been the only approach utilized by the courts.
105. 379 F. Supp. 338, 346-48 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
106. Id. at 343.
107. Id. at 352.
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Due to the judicial tendency to analyze legal problems narrowly,
this approach should retain popularity.
CONCLUSION

Of the four areas of treatment and rehabilitation analyzedprison labor, education, religion, medical treatment/behavior
modification-only two, prison labor and religion, appear to be
conclusive regarding a prisoner's right to refuse such treatment
or rehabilitation. The thirteenth amendment and the cases arising thereunder provide for involuntary prison labor, and the first
amendment freedom of religion provides for the free exercise of
atheism by a prisoner. Compulsory educational participation by
prisoners has been recognized in the eighth circuit but remains
a tenuous proposition. While the cases indicating that a prisoner
has a right to refuse medical treatment/behavior modification
are compelling and frequently discussed *0 8 they remain too few
in number to be an effective survey.
Consequently, time will be the determining factor for a
prisoner's right to refuse treatment and rehabilitation. One can
only wait to discover whether such a "right" will be firmly
embedded in, rejected by, or remain on the periphery of the law
of corrections and prisoners' rights.
Marc D. Ginsberg

108. See note 51 supra.

